The Heuristic View

This volume offers a series of thought-provoking analyses that explore non-mainstream perspectives on knowledge acquisition and scientific discovery. A central theme across many of the contributions is the heuristic conception of method, a view that finds its philosophical roots in Imre Lakatos's work in the philosophy of mathematics and, more distantly, in Platonic notions of philosophical inquiry.

Knowledge acquisition is frequently conceptualized as a form of problem-solving, and problem-solving is typically regarded as a rational endeavor. However, the dominant view in the philosophy of science has long held that scientific discovery resists systematic explanation in terms of logic and rationality. If an alternative account of discovery grounded in these terms can be developed, it would represent a significant theoretical advancement.

The essays collected in this book critically assess the promise and limitations of such non-standard accounts, and they investigate the possibility of framing scientific discovery within a logical and rational framework. This volume will be of particular interest to scholars in the philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of logic, as well as to scientists engaged in theoretical inquiry and graduate students working in these or related areas.