The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships

The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships studies how institutional and social factors influence corruption in dictatorships. Dictatorships are often synonymous with high levels of corruption, yet Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue otherwise. The authors ask why corruption has declined in some but not other authoritarian regimes. What are the main political factors that drive some autocrats to curb corruption? The book explores the role that business mobilization can play in reducing corruption under certain conditions in dictatorships. It investigates how political competition for an elected legislature affects the incentives of dictators to engage in corruption. The study relies on case studies from Jordan, Malaysia, and Uganda. The book is accessible to a wide audience without requiring sophisticated statistical training.

Vineeta Yadav is an associate professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University. Her research interests include studying how institutions influence economic development, business-politics, judicial politics, and politics of India, Brazil, and China. She was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Princeton University. She is the author of Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries (2011), which won the 2013 Leon Epstein Outstanding Book Prize by the APSA Political Organizations and Parties Section, the 2012 Rosenthal Prize by the APSA Legislative Studies Section, and received an Honorable Mention for the 2012 best book award from the APSA Comparative Democratization Section. She is also coauthor of Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Judicial Empowerment in Developing Countries (2014).

Bumba Mukherjee is a professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University. His research interests include studying how political institutions affect monetary policy and financial markets, the political economy of financial crises, the impact of democratic politics on trade protection, the design and effect of international institutions, and statistical methodology. He was a Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University and a Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame. He is the author of Globalization, Democracy, and Trade Policy in the Developing World (forthcoming) and coauthor of Democracy, Electoral Institutions, and Judicial Empowerment in Developing Countries (2014).
The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships

VINEETA YADAV
Penn State University

BUMBA MUKHERJEE
Penn State University
To my parents, Ramesh and Shashi Yadav
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