Quine and Davidson are among the leading thinkers of the twentieth century. Their influence on contemporary philosophy is second to none, and their impact is also strongly felt in disciplines such as linguistics and psychology. This is the first book devoted to both of them, but also the first to question some of their basic assumptions. Hans-Johann Glock critically scrutinizes their ideas on ontology, analyticity, apriority and necessity, truth, meaning and interpretation, thought and language, and shows that their attempts to accommodate meaning and thought within a naturalistic framework, either by impugning intensional notions as unclear and non-factual or by extracting them from physical facts, are ultimately unsuccessful. His discussion includes interesting comparisons of Quine and Davidson with other philosophers, particularly Wittgenstein. Glock also offers detailed accounts of central issues in contemporary analytic philosophy, such as whether philosophy is continuous with science, whether truth is a feature of sentences or propositions, whether meaning and reference are indeterminate, whether language requires conventions, and whether animals are capable of having beliefs and desires.

HANS-JOHANN GLOCK is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Reading. He is the author of A Wittgenstein Dictionary (1996), which has been translated into German, French, Portuguese and Polish. He is editor of The Rise of Analytic Philosophy (1997), Wittgenstein: a Critical Reader (2001), and Strawson and Kant (2003), and co-editor (with Robert L. Arrington) of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1991), and Wittgenstein and Quine (1996).
Für Gabi
It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes that others accept without thinking twice. A dangerous profession, since philosophers are more easily discredited than platitudes, but a useful one. For when a good philosopher challenges a platitude, it usually turns out that the platitude was essentially right; but the philosopher has noticed trouble that one who did not think twice could not have met. In the end, the challenge is answered and the platitude survives, more often than not. But the philosopher has done the adherents of the platitude a service: he has made them think twice.

(David Lewis 1969: 1)
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Abbreviations

Works by Quine

Books

RR The Roots of Reference (La Salle: Open Court, 1974).
List of abbreviations

Other items

RDH 'Replies', in Davidson and Hintikka (eds.), 1969.
RHS 'Replies to Critics', in Hahn and Schilpp (eds.), 1986.
List of abbreviations


Works by Davidson

Books
EAE Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford University Press, 1980).
ITI Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1984).
SIO Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford University Press, 2001).

Other items
List of abbreviations


