Ambition theory suggests that scholars can understand a good deal about politics by exploring politicians’ career goals. In the United States, an enormous literature explains congressional politics by assuming that politicians primarily desire to win reelection. In contrast, although Brazil’s institutions appear to encourage incumbency, politicians do not seek to build a career within the legislature. Instead, political ambition focuses on – and Brazilian political careers are constructed at – the subnational level. Even while serving in the legislature, Brazilian legislators act strategically to further their future extralegislative careers by serving as “ambassadors” of subnational governments. Brazil’s federal institutions also affect politicians’ electoral prospects and career goals, heightening the importance of subnational interests in the lower chamber of the national legislature. Together, ambition and federalism help explain important dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Brazil. This book’s rational-choice institutionalist perspective contributes to the literature on the importance of federalism and subnational politics to understanding national-level politics around the world.

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Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil

DAVID SAMUELS
University of Minnesota
For ESB
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

NEWSPAPERS
- FSP: Folha de São Paulo
- GM: Gazeta Mercantil
- JB: Journal do Brasil
- NYT: New York Times
- OESP: O Estado de São Paulo

POLITICAL PARTIES*
- ARENA: Aliança Renovador Nacional (National Renovating Alliance)
- PAN: Partido da Ação Nacional (Party of National Action)
- PCdoB: Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil)
- PDC: Partido da Democracia Cristã (Christian Democratic Party)
- PDS: Partido Democrático Social (Social Democratic Party)
- PDT: Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labor Party)
- PFL: Partido da Frente Liberal (Party of the Liberal Front)
- PL: Partido Liberal (Liberal Party)
- MDB/PMDB: Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement); known as the MDB before a party-law reform in 1979
- PP: Partido Popular (Popular Party)
- PPR: Partido Progressista Renovador (Party of Progressive Renewal)
- PPS: Partido Popular Socialista (ex-Partido Comunista Brasileiro) (Popular Socialist Party)
- PRN: Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (Party of National Reconstruction)
- PSB: Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party)

* Note: See Mainwaring (1999) for descriptions of most of these parties.
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Partido do Solidarismo Libertador (Party of Liberating Solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Partido Social Trabalhista (Social Labor Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTU</td>
<td>Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificados (Unified Socialist Workers' Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV</td>
<td>Partido Verde (Green Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDN</td>
<td>União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union)</td>
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### Other

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (National Economic and Social Development Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Comissão Mista do Orçamento (Joint Budget Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFINS</td>
<td>Contribuição para o Financiamento de Seguridade Social (Contribution for Financing Social Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFAZ</td>
<td>Conselho de Política Fazendária (Council on State Finance Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPMF</td>
<td>Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira (Provisionary Contribution on Financial Transactions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAP</td>
<td>Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar (Inter-Union Legislative Research Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGV</td>
<td>Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Getúlio Vargas Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPE</td>
<td>Fundo de Participação dos Estados (State Participation Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>Fundo de Participação dos Municípios (Municipal Participation Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRL</td>
<td>Fiscal Responsibility Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>Fundo Social de Emergência (Social Emergency Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMS</td>
<td>Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (Tax on Circulation of Merchandise and Services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados (Tax on Industrialized Products)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Imposto de Renda (Personal Income Tax)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Member of Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>Contribuição para o Programa de Integração Social (Contribution for the Social Integration Program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRE</td>
<td>Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (Regional Electoral Tribunal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSE</td>
<td>Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Superior Electoral Tribunal)</td>
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