This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* and Russell’s theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts, and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the *Tractatus*, it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston, and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts and a number of recent students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realist conception of truth and issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth and those interested in Russell and the *Tractatus*.

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The Correspondence Theory of Truth
An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication

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Now, it is agreed that every true predication has some basis in the nature of things.

Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, 8
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