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Preface

1 How simple is truth?
   1 ‘What Percy says is true’ means (1) ‘For some p, both Percy says that p and p’.
   2 Cohen’s objection that mechanical substitution for ‘p’ in (1) will not work.
   3 A Quinian objection that (1) involves quantification into an opaque context.
   4 Jones’s objection that (1) is elliptical.
   5 ‘Objectual’ and ‘substitutional’ quantification: (1) does not commit us ‘ontologically’ to Propositions.

2 Predicating truth
   1 The ‘ascriptivist’ theory of truth fails to eliminate ‘true’ as a predicate.
   2 So does Ramsey’s ‘redundancy’ theory.
   3 Strawson’s later theory appears to be taking ‘true’ as a predicate, but two versions of the theory must be distinguished. ‘As A’s statement has it, X is eligible’ and ‘Things are as A says they are’. Pronouns of laziness and bound variables.
   4 An argument to show that ‘As A’s statement has it, X is eligible’ does not predicate anything of A’s statement refuted.
   5 But what ‘As A’s statement has it, X is eligible’ predicates of A’s statement is not that it is true. This is predicated of it by ‘Things are as A says they are’ or its more formal equivalent (16) ‘For some p, both A’s statement states that p and p’.
   6 Nevertheless, it is not possible to give an explicit definition of ‘— is true’.

3 Truths
   1 What sort of things are true to be discovered by examining the logic of expressions like ‘What Percy says’.
   2 Preliminary examination of the analogous ‘What the postman brought’. This is an incomplete symbol and a second-level predicate.
   3 ‘What Percy says’ is also an incomplete symbol, and so does not refer to anything.
What is truth?

But ‘What Percy says’ in its deep structure is not a second-
level predicate, although in some contexts it is a second-level
function, e.g. with ‘is believed by Pauline’ as argument.

The symbolic representation of ‘What Percy says is true’ does
not split into function and argument. The argument here
evaporates.

Kneale’s explanation of the redundancy of ‘It is true that —’. 
Sentences where the Proposition said to be true is designated 
but not expressed taken as primary.

Jones reverses this order, but his doctrine leaves the existence 
of the word ‘true’ unexplained.

The explanation to be sought in the fact that the surface struc-
ture of our language presents ‘What Percy says’ as a second-
level predicate requiring a first-level predicate as its argument.

Quantifiers to be distinguished from second-level predicates.
Quantifiers can be combined just with sentential variables to 
produce complete sentences. The definite description operator 
to be regarded as a quantifier. It provides a symbolic equiva-
 lent of ‘What Percy says is true’ which has no predicative 
expression corresponding to ‘— is true’.

The ‘verifier’ of a proposition containing ‘What the postman 
brought’ will contain the name of an object not named in the 
proposition verified. Not so the ‘verifier’ of a proposition 
containing ‘What Percy says’. The former is ‘indirectly’, 
although not ‘directly’, about something. The latter is not 
even ‘indirectly’ about anything.

FALSEHOODS

‘What Percy says is true’ and ‘What Percy says is false’ seem 
to be contraries, not contradictories. Russellian and Straw-
sonian views about the relationship between them.

Geach’s doctrine of multiple assertion extended to cover 
sentences containing definite descriptions. ‘What Percy says 
is true’ tantamount to the joint assertion of ‘Percy says just one 
thing’ and ‘For every p, if Percy says that p, p’.

‘Percy says just one thing’ presupposed rather than entailed 
by ‘What Percy says is true’. The Strawsonian ‘Things are 
as Percy says they are’ also presupposes this, and is thus prefer-
able as an analysis to the Aristotelian ‘Percy says of what is 
that it is’.

‘What Percy says’, like ‘What the postman brought’ pre-
supposes something. So does the use of a proper name. This 
partly responsible for the inclination to regard ‘What Percy 
says’ as referring to an object.
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5 Revised formulae for the analysanta of ‘What Percy says is true’ and ‘What Percy says is false’.

5 Correspondence

1 The Correspondence Theory must regard truth as a relational property. Difficulty of finding an object to which what is called ‘true’ is on this view said to be related. Similar difficulties in regarding being married as a relational property. Both more properly classified as quantificational properties.

2 Being married relational in the sense that a relational expression ‘— is married to . . . ’ enters into its analysis. Truth relational in this sense only if ‘— corresponds to . . . ’ enters irreducibly into its analysis. The claim of ‘Things are as Percy says they are’ to give an analysis of ‘Percy’s statement corresponds to the facts’. Warnock’s objection to the claim rebutted.

3 Neither term of the correspondence relation survives our analysis, an analysis which involves the existential quantifier. The same quantifier, binding two variables, does the work done by both terms of the correspondence relation. Nor does any two-place predicate occur in our final analysis of ‘Percy’s statement corresponds to the facts’.

4 Residual sense in which truth is relational. Warnock’s confusion between relational property and contingent property exposed. Sense in which to discover whether a proposition is true we have in general to look ‘outside’ the proposition. Our analysis of ‘true’ contains, if not a relational expression, at least a function of two arguments, namely ‘— and . . . ’.

5 More than mere conjunction required for the analysis of truth. Mackie’s ‘comparison account’. Propositions of the form ‘For some x, Fx and Gx’ assert that a second-level relation holds between two first-level concepts. They are composed of a second-level verb and two first-level verbs. Propositions of the form ‘For some p, Jp and Dp’ analogously composed of a second-level adverb and two first-level adverbs. The second-level adverb occurs also in our analysis of ‘What Percy says is true’. Analogies thus reach back from this to straightforwardly relational propositions and explain the inclination to call truth relational. Talk of the relation of correspondence is in this way understandable.

Appendix: List of inset, numbered expressions discussed in the text

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